Thailand has not only been plagued by divisive domestic political turmoil. Its relations with neighboring Cambodia have also deteriorated and intensified, resulting in fatal clashes along their common border.
Competing political factions have incessantly used nationalism to legitimize their political activities. The violent confrontation between Thai nationalists and Cambodian villagers in the past few days could further strain this vulnerable bilateral relationship.
Nationalism in Thailand has become a highly destructive force both in domestic and international politics. From late 2007, in their campaign to topple the governments that emerged from the post-coup elections, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and some elements of the Democrat Party, claimed to represent the true face of Thai nationalism.
In this, they claimed to stand on the side of righteousness by protecting the nation’s territorial integrity, to rid the people of corrupt politicians, and in their duty to challenge an allegedly predatory neighbor.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and successive pro-Thaksin governments were grouped together with alien foreigners, like Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was regarded as a deranged person. These alien characters were represented as having a single objective: selling the country out and tarnishing the good reputation of Thailand built up by past monarchs.
The conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple, to the PAD, was indeed a conflict between those who are true Thais versus Thaksin suporters. It saw its duty as that of protecting Thailand’s national interests, and the best way to do so was to stir up nationalistic feelings.
At first glance, nationalism seemed to serve the political need of both the PAD and the Democrat Party. Both were unable to unseat Thaksin-backed governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat and to uproot Thaksin’s influence in politics. The Preah Vihear Temple issue emerged at the right moment when the PAD and also the military that supported anti-Thaksin sentiment were facing a legitimacy crisis themselves.
But little did they know that in employing the Preah Vihear conflict to eliminate Thaksin, the PAD was also jeopardizing its position in politics, and in particular endangering its representation of Thai nationalism. It played along with the theme of lost territories, falsifying historical facts and portraying Thailand as a vulnerable state perpetually victimized by immoral foreigners.
In this paranoid narrative, Thaksin was helping immoral foreigners to take away the country’s sacred assets and pride. The PAD then adopted certain nationalistic tactics against its opponents, such as condemning them for selling out the country and through its own rhetoric provoking military confrontations with the Cambodians.
The reality is that Preah Vihear Temple belongs to Cambodia, according to the International Court of Justice ruling of 1962. But the loss became an unacceptable political reality because it deals with the national pride that has been deeply ingrained in the mindset of Thais.
The outcome of these political tactics has been destructive. Thai domestic politics has become increasingly polarized. Thailand’s relations with Cambodia have reached a critical point, verging on full-blown war. Who has gained what out of this nationalistic crusade?
As a consequence, the issue of overlapping territories returned to the attention of the Thai public. The spirit of nationhood was high. Thaksin was once again labeled as a Thai who betrayed his motherland.
However, the PAD also became a casualty in the game of nationalism. It opened up a Pandora’s box of bewilderment about Thai self-identity. Was the PAD brand of nationalism a reflection of the Thai way to express love for country?
Didn’t its call for war with Cambodia run against its earlier representations of Thainess: of being a peaceful nation, as enunciated in the words of Thailand’s national anthem?
The PAD might have found nationalism an effective way of deposing of the Thaksin-backed regimes in the past, but the nationalist flame has been fanned and the conflagration has shown the potential to rage out of control.
The latest clashes near the Thai-Cambodian border demonstrated that the PAD is not willing to give up its nationalist tactics.
This is perhaps due to the fact that the PAD recently transformed itself into a legitimate political party—the New Politics Party. It now hopes to exploit the Preah Vihear Temple issue to score political points should elections be called by the current government in the next few months.
It is therefore anticipated that the temple issue will become more intense as Thailand heads into an even more uncertain future.
Competing political factions have incessantly used nationalism to legitimize their political activities. The violent confrontation between Thai nationalists and Cambodian villagers in the past few days could further strain this vulnerable bilateral relationship.
Nationalism in Thailand has become a highly destructive force both in domestic and international politics. From late 2007, in their campaign to topple the governments that emerged from the post-coup elections, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), and some elements of the Democrat Party, claimed to represent the true face of Thai nationalism.
In this, they claimed to stand on the side of righteousness by protecting the nation’s territorial integrity, to rid the people of corrupt politicians, and in their duty to challenge an allegedly predatory neighbor.
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and successive pro-Thaksin governments were grouped together with alien foreigners, like Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, who was regarded as a deranged person. These alien characters were represented as having a single objective: selling the country out and tarnishing the good reputation of Thailand built up by past monarchs.
The conflict over the Preah Vihear Temple, to the PAD, was indeed a conflict between those who are true Thais versus Thaksin suporters. It saw its duty as that of protecting Thailand’s national interests, and the best way to do so was to stir up nationalistic feelings.
At first glance, nationalism seemed to serve the political need of both the PAD and the Democrat Party. Both were unable to unseat Thaksin-backed governments of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat and to uproot Thaksin’s influence in politics. The Preah Vihear Temple issue emerged at the right moment when the PAD and also the military that supported anti-Thaksin sentiment were facing a legitimacy crisis themselves.
But little did they know that in employing the Preah Vihear conflict to eliminate Thaksin, the PAD was also jeopardizing its position in politics, and in particular endangering its representation of Thai nationalism. It played along with the theme of lost territories, falsifying historical facts and portraying Thailand as a vulnerable state perpetually victimized by immoral foreigners.
In this paranoid narrative, Thaksin was helping immoral foreigners to take away the country’s sacred assets and pride. The PAD then adopted certain nationalistic tactics against its opponents, such as condemning them for selling out the country and through its own rhetoric provoking military confrontations with the Cambodians.
The reality is that Preah Vihear Temple belongs to Cambodia, according to the International Court of Justice ruling of 1962. But the loss became an unacceptable political reality because it deals with the national pride that has been deeply ingrained in the mindset of Thais.
The outcome of these political tactics has been destructive. Thai domestic politics has become increasingly polarized. Thailand’s relations with Cambodia have reached a critical point, verging on full-blown war. Who has gained what out of this nationalistic crusade?
As a consequence, the issue of overlapping territories returned to the attention of the Thai public. The spirit of nationhood was high. Thaksin was once again labeled as a Thai who betrayed his motherland.
However, the PAD also became a casualty in the game of nationalism. It opened up a Pandora’s box of bewilderment about Thai self-identity. Was the PAD brand of nationalism a reflection of the Thai way to express love for country?
Didn’t its call for war with Cambodia run against its earlier representations of Thainess: of being a peaceful nation, as enunciated in the words of Thailand’s national anthem?
The PAD might have found nationalism an effective way of deposing of the Thaksin-backed regimes in the past, but the nationalist flame has been fanned and the conflagration has shown the potential to rage out of control.
The latest clashes near the Thai-Cambodian border demonstrated that the PAD is not willing to give up its nationalist tactics.
This is perhaps due to the fact that the PAD recently transformed itself into a legitimate political party—the New Politics Party. It now hopes to exploit the Preah Vihear Temple issue to score political points should elections be called by the current government in the next few months.
It is therefore anticipated that the temple issue will become more intense as Thailand heads into an even more uncertain future.
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